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Labor and Employment Law

by W. Melvin Haas, III*
William M. Clifton, III**
and W. Jonathan Martin, II'*"
I.

This Article

INTRODUCTION

surveys recent developments

in

state statutory and

common law that affect labor and employment relations of Georgia
employers. Accordingly, it surveys published decisions from the Georgia
Court of Appeals and Georgia Supreme Court from June 1, 2005 to May

31, 2006. This Article also highlights specific revisions to the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated.
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RECENT LEGISLATION

Employment Security Law

Without regard to the General Assembly's changes to the "Workers'
Compensation" section1 of the Georgia Labor and Industrial Relations
Code ("Labor Code"), 2 the General Assembly passed one significant
amendment to the employment security section of the Georgia Labor
Code during the survey period. The General Assembly limited the
definition of employment for purposes of employment security law by
amending Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 34-835.3 In doing so, the General Assembly added an additional paragraph
to the statute that excludes from the definition of "employment" certain
types of "direct sellers."4 Specifically, the new paragraph excludes from
the definition of "employment":
(18) Services performed by a direct seller, provided that:
(A) Such individual:
(i) Is engaged in the trade or business of selling or soliciting the sale
of consumer products, including services or other intangibles, to any
buyer on a buy-sell basis, a deposit-commission basis, or any similar
basis for resale by the buyer or any other person in the home or
otherwise than in a permanent retail establishment; or
(ii) Is engaged in the trade or business of selling or soliciting the sale
of consumer products, including services or other intangibles, in the
home or otherwise than in a permanent retail establishment;
(B) Substantially all the remuneration, whether or not paid in cash, for

the performance of the services described in subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph is directly related to sales or other output, including the
performance of services, rather than to the number of hours worked;
and
(C) The services performed by the individual are performed pursuant
to a written contract between such individual and the person for whom
the services are performed and such contract provides that the

1. Recent developments in workers' compensation law are discussed in H. Michael
Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen & Katherine D. Dixon, Workers' Compensation, 58 MERCER L.
REV. 453 (2006).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-1-1 to 34-15-42 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
3. Ga. S.B. 486, § 1, Reg. Sess. (2006) (amending O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35 (2004 & Supp.
2006)).
4. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35(n)(18).
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individual will not be treated as an employee for federal and state tax
purposes.'
The United States Internal Revenue Service has recognized a distinction
between such direct sellers and "common retailers" for some time,
addressing the issue in IRS Publication 911 and providing that "direct
sellers are self-employed."6 The recent amendment brings Georgia's
labor code into accord with the United States Internal Revenue Code, as
it applies to direct sellers.!
While the amendment has not been controversial to date, it does raise
a series of questions as to its necessity and clarity. Regarding the
necessity of the amendment, it seems intuitive that direct sellers are in
business for themselves, and not employees of their respective corporate
suppliers. As to clarity, the amendment advances, without apparent
explanation, a significantly lower standard of scrutiny for individuals to
qualify as direct sellers when compared to the immediately preceding
paragraph, which deals with individuals performing services for common
carriers.'
Although substantially similar to the definition of direct
seller, in order to qualify for exemption from the term employment under
O.C.G.A. section 34-8-35(n)(17), individuals performing certain services
for common carriers must, inter alia, have "a written contract with the
common carrier" that "does not prohibit such individual from the pickup,
transportation, or delivery of property for more than one common carrier

5. Id. For example, direct seller representatives such as Amway, Mary Kay, Tastefully
Simple, and others would not be considered employed by the respective corporate brands.
6. I.R.S. Publication 911: Direct Sellers 2 (Rev. November 2004), available at
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p911--2004.pdf.
You are a direct seller if you meet all the following conditions.
1. You are engaged in one of the following trades or businesses.
a. Selling or soliciting the sale of consumer products, eitheri. In a home or other place that is not a permanent retail establishment, or
ii. To any buyer on a buy-sell basis or a deposit-commission basis for resale
in a home or other place that is not a permanent retail establishment.
b. Delivering or distributing newspapers or shopping news (including any
services directly related to that trade or business).
2. Substantially all your pay (whether paid in cash or not) for services described
in (1) is directly related to sales or other output (including the performance of
services) rather than to the number of hours worked.
3. Your services are performed under a written contract between you and the
person for whom you perform the services, and the contract provides that you will
not be treated as an employee for federal tax purposes.
Id.
7. See O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35; 26 U.S.C. § 3508(b)(2) (2000).
8. See Ga. S.B. 486, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35); compare O.C.G.A. § 34-835(n)(17).
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or any other person or entity," and the individual must know that "the
work is not covered by the unemployment compensation laws of
Georgia."9 The new amendment, however, does not require direct
sellers to pass any relatively stringent level of scrutiny.'" Finally, the
recent amendment, while seemingly intended to define direct seller, may
inspire unintended confusion as to who is a direct seller because the
requirements for qualification under the statute may apply to occupations traditionally held to be included under the term "employment.""l
For example, an agent for an insurance broker, who would have
previously been covered as an "employee," might now be excluded from
the unemployment insurance safeguards if he or she works from
home. 12
B. Immigration Law
The most significant employment legislation passed by the Georgia
General Assembly during the survey period was the Georgia Security
and Immigration Compliance Act ("the Act"), commonly known by its
Senate Bill acronym S.B. 529."8 The Act has been characterized as
controversial and far-reaching, with provisions amending seven titles to
the O.C.G.A. and creating several short titles. 4 The Act seeks to

9. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35(n)(17).
10. See Ga. S.B. 486, § 1 (enacting new O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35(n)(18)). There is no
requirement that direct sellers be paid exclusively in commissions or for tasks performed,
no prohibition on contractual exclusivity, and no emphasis on the direct seller's
responsibility for taxes or lack of workers' compensation coverage.
11. Id.
12. This seems to be at odds with the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 34-8-35(f), which
places the burden of proof upon the employer to establish that an employee is an
independent contractor. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35(f).
13. Ga. S.B. 529, Reg. Sess. (2006) (enacting new O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-90, 13-10-91, 16-546, 35-2-14, 42-4-14, 43-20A-1 to -4, 48-7-21.1, 48-7-101(i), 50-36-1 (Supp. 2006)).
14. Id. The Preamble to S.B. 529 provides:
To amend Titles 13, 16, 35, 42, 43, 48, and 50 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated, relating to contracts, crimes and offenses, law enforcement officers and
agencies, penal institutions, professions and businesses, revenue and taxation, and
state government, respectively, so as to provide for the comprehensive regulation
of persons in this state who are not lawfully present in the United States; to
provide for a short title; to provide for statutory construction; to provide for
definitions; to provide for procedures and requirements applicable to certain
contracts or subcontracts; to provide for powers, duties, and authority of the
Commissioner of Labor; to provide that it shall be unlawful to traffic a person for
labor or sexual servitude; to provide that the commissioner of public safety is
authorized and directed to negotiate the terms of a memorandum of understanding between the State of Georgia and the United States Department of Justice or
Department of Homeland Security concerning the enforcement of federal
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ensure greater control over, and sanctions against, employers who hire
persons not authorized to work in the United States. 5 Three particular provisions directly impact employers, namely: (1) the imposition of
criminal sanctions for trafficking a person for labor servitude; 16 (2) the
requirement that entities who contract with the State of Georgia or its
political subdivisions register and participate in the federal work
authorization program; 7 and (3) income tax and tax withholding
implications associated with the employment of persons not authorized
to work in the United States. 8 Opponents of the Act have threatened
to challenge its legality with possible preemption and equal protection
litigation."9

1. Criminal Sanctions
The Act adds a new criminal code section to the O.C.G.A. that provides
criminal penalties for any person or corporation that "knowingly subjects
or maintains another in labor servitude or knowingly recruits, entices,
harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means another person
for the purpose of labor servitude."2 The activities that trigger the
criminal provisions of the Act are broadly defined. For example, "labor

immigration laws and related activities; to provide for a definition; to provide for
certain training; to provide for funding; to provide for certain authorized activities
by certain peace officers; to provide for valid identification documents; to provide
for exceptions; to provide procedures for determining nationality and immigration
status of certain persons who are booked into a jail; to provide for the development
of guidelines relative to such booking procedures; to provide for the comprehensive
regulation of private immigration assistance services; to provide for a short title;
to provide a statement of purpose and definitions; to specify conditions under
which certain compensation paid by a taxpayer shall be disallowed as a business
expense for state income tax purposes; to provide for powers, duties, and authority
of the state revenue commissioner; to provide for additional withholding
requirements and procedures; to provide for exceptions; to provide for verification
of lawful presence requirements, procedures, and conditions regarding applications
for certain benefits; to provide for exceptions; to provide for the promulgation of
regulations; to provide for criminal and other penalties; to provide for related
matters; to provide for effective dates; to provide for applicability; to repeal
conflicting laws; and for other purposes.
Preamble to Ga. S.B. 529.
15. Ga. S.B. 529.
16. Id. § 3 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(b)).
17. Id. § 2 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-90, -91).
18. Id. §§ 7, 8 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 48-7-21.1(a)-(b)).
19. Jim Tharpe, Perdue Signs Bill on Illegals; Crackdown Law Faces Challenges,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 18, 2006, at IA.
20. Ga. S.B. 529, § 3 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(b)).
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servitude" is defined as "work or service of economic or financial value
which is performed or provided by another person and is induced or
obtained by coercion or deception."2 1 "Coercion" and "deception" are
also broadly defined under the Act. 2 "Coercion" includes any act
resulting in bodily harm, threats of bodily harm, restraint, exposing or
threatening to expose a person to criminal or immigration proceedings,
or confiscating documents. 23 "Deception" includes conduct that is
generally considered deceptive, such as creating or confirming another's
false impressions or promising benefits not intended to be delivered.24
The possible penalties for violating the criminal provision are
significant. Convicted offenders will be classified as felons. 25 The
statutory sentencing range varies depending upon the age of the
victim.

26

Where the victim is over the age of eighteen, the sentence can

range from a minimum of one year to a maximum of twenty years.27
For victims under the age of eighteen, the punishment is a minimum of
ten years to a maximum of twenty years.28 The Act also specifically
allows for the prosecution of a corporate entity when an agent of the
corporation, acting within the scope of employment, performs the illegal
conduct and that conduct is "authorized, requested, commanded,
performed, or within the scope of... employment ...or constitute[s] a
pattern of illegal activity that
an agent of the company knew or should
29
have known was occurring."

2. Federal Work Authorization Program Requirement
The Act amends Title 13 of the O.C.G.A., adding two code sections
related to contracts with the State of Georgia or its political subdivisions. 30 Together, these two code sections specifically prohibit these
public entities from entering into contracts in connection with the
"physical performance of services" within Georgia unless the contractor
or subcontractor is registered and participates in the "federal work

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(a)(3)).
Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(a)(1) to (2)).
Id. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(a)(1)(A) to -(D)).
Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(a)(2)(A) to (C)).
Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(d)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-46(g)).
Id. § 2 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-90, -91).
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authorization program" to verify information pertaining to all new
employees. 3
The term "contractor" is not defined in the Act. However, the Act
states that the term "'[s]ubcontractor' includes a subcontractor, contract
employee, staffing agency, or any contractor regardless of its tier." 2 Of
particular note is the specific inclusion of "contract employees," which
seems to indicate that an individual independent contractor would have
to register and participate in the federal work authorization program. 3
Also, the inclusion of staffing agencies within the definition of "subcontractor" requires any of these entities supplying workers to public
entities on a temporary basis to register and participate in the federal
work authorization program as well.34
The Act's requirement to register and participate in the "[flederal work
authorization program" is not as clear cut as it may seem.35 The Act
defines "[flederal work authorization program" as "any of the electronic
verification of work authorization programs operated by the United
States Department of Homeland Security or any equivalent federal work
authorization program operated by the United States Department of
Homeland Security to verify information of newly hired employees .
,,36 Given that the Act has just recently been signed into law,
and thus there are no rules or regulations, this provision will likely
require participation in the federal employment verification pilot
program currently operated by the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") entitled "Basic Pilot."37 Currently, employers may use the
Basic Pilot program on a voluntary and free basis.3 " The Basic Pilot
program started out in five states and has now been expanded to allow
participation of employers throughout the United States.39 However,

31. Id.
32. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 13-10-90(4)).
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 13-10-90(2)).
36. Id.
37. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Basic Pilot Information, https://www.
vis-dhs.com/employerregistration/RequestParticipation.aspx?BPAccessMethod=WEB-BP
(last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
38. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, VerificationInformation System (VIS),
https://www.vis-dhs.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
39. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, SAVE Program,http://www.uscis.gov/
graphics/services/save.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006); see also INSTITUTE FOR SURVEY
RESEARCH, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY & WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE BASIc PILOT PROGRAM
EVALUATION 61 (2002), available at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies/
piloteval/PilotEvalComplete.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006). "The Basic Pilot program was
implemented in the five States with the largest estimated populations of undocumented

218

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

there has been concern regarding whether DHS will be able to sustain
the cost and the infrastructure if participation in the program is greater
than expected.4" In fact, DHS has specifically noted that if significantly
morp employers than anticipated choose to participate, the program may
have to be limited to a certain number of participants.4' This is
especially pertinent because the Act requires use of a viable DHS work
authorization program.42 Presently, Basic Pilot is the only available
work authorization program, and it is unknown what effect a significant
national increase in Basic Pilot volume may have on the implementation
of Georgia's Act. If DHS is unable to meet demand, complying with the
Georgia Act would become impossible, and it is unlikely that the Act
could be used to punish an employer who could not satisfy the requirements of the Act because of such impossibility. Notwithstanding these
considerations, the language of the Act appears to contemplate that the
Basic Pilot program will be expanded, enhanced, renamed, or otherwise
altered, but that regardless of the disposition of Basic Pilot, any entity
that contracts with the state will be required
to use whatever program
43
DHS substitutes for Basic Pilot, if any.
i. Registration and Participation. Registration and use of the Basic
Pilot program appears to be fairly straightforward. The program is an
internet application accessed via a webpage; users simply follow the
instructions on the screen to complete the process.44 The user is
required to execute a "Memorandum of Understanding" and will receive
a user identification and password.45 The Basic Pilot program allows
an employer to specify an entity DHS refers to as a "Designated Agent"
who would perform the actual verification process on its behalf.46 The
Act does not seem to take this into account; it appears to require that
the actual contractor or subcontractor register and participate in the
program.47

immigrants (California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas)." Id.
40. INSTITuTE FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY & WESTAT, supra note 39,
at 199-202.
41. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, SAVE Program,http://www.uscis.gov/
graphics/services/save.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
42. See generally Ga. S.B. 529.
43. Id. § 2 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-90(2), 13-10-91(a), (b)).
44. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Employer Registration, https://www.
visdhs.com/EmployerRegistration/StartPage.aspx?JS=YES&AccessMethod= (last visited
Sept. 9, 2006).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Ga. S.B. 529, § 2 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 13-10-91(b)(1), (2)).
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Following registration, the user must complete a web-based tutorial
on the use of the program, which walks the user through the various
steps in the process.48 The Basic Pilot program is designed to allow the
employer to verify the employment eligibility of newly hired employees. 49 The verification of employment query is performed after an
employee has been hired and the normal 1-9 process has been completed,
but must be completed within three business days of the employee's hire
date.5 ° The system cannot be used to pre-screen applicants for employment. 1 After joining the program, an employer would not be allowed
to check the status of existing employees (re-verification).52
ii. Issuance of Rules and Regulations. The Act grants the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Labor the authority to promulgate
forms, rules, and regulations to administer the Act." Interestingly, the
Act alternatively provides that the Commissioner of the Georgia
Department of Transportation has the authority to issue forms, rules,
and regulations for contracts concerning public transportation.5 4 The
Act further specifies that these rules and regulations
are to be posted on
55
the respective websites of each department.
iii. Staggered Dates of Implementation. The Act has staggered dates
of implementation, requiring that public employers, contractors, and
subcontractors with 500 or more employees must comply with the Act
beginning on or after July 1, 2007; those with 100 or more employees
must comply by July 1, 2008; and all must be in compliance by July 1,
2009.56 The staggered implementation dates likely are reflective of the
Georgia General Assembly's confidence and expectation that DHS will
improve the federal work authorization system to keep up with demand
over the course of the two year phase-in period.

48. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, SAVE Program, http://www.uscis.gov/
graphics/services/save.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Ga. S.B. 529, § 2 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-91(d), (e)).
54. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 13-10-91(e)).
55. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-91(d), (e)). The websites may be
accessed as follows: (1) Georgia Department of Labor, http://www.dol.state.ga.us/ and (2)
Georgia Department of Transportation, http://www.dot.state.ga.us/.
56. Ga. S.B. 529, § 2 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 13-10-91(b)(3)).
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3. Tax Implications
The Act also amends Title 48 of the O.C.G.A. as it relates to revenue
and taxation.57 The Act provides that on or after January 1, 2008, no
wages for labor services of $600 or more may be claimed as a business
deduction for state income tax purposes unless the employee is an
"authorized employee" in the United States, as defined by federal law.58
Thus, the Act removes a significant benefit from any employer who
chooses not to authorize employees through the Basic Pilot program.
Yet, the General Assembly did provide several exceptions. This portion
of the Act does not apply to: (1) any business domiciled in Georgia that
is exempt from compliance with federal employment verification
procedures;59 (2) any individual hired by the taxpayer prior to January
1, 2008; 6 (3) any taxpayer where the individual being paid is not
directly compensated by that taxpayer; 1 or (4) wages paid for labor
services to any person who holds and presents to the taxpayer a valid
license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver
Services. 2
Although the Act also provides an exemption for any person who holds
and presents a valid license or identification card issued by the Georgia
Department of Driver Services,63 Georgia employers should be cautious
to avoid hiring only individuals, or a disproportionate number of
individuals, who present these documents. A refusal to hire unless the
employee has either a valid license or identification card could lead to
liability for 1-9 violations.64 The provision inadvertently, yet inherent-

57. Id. § 7 (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 48-7-21.1).
58. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. §§ 48-7-21.1(a), (b)).
59. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 48-7-21.1(c)).
60. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 48-7-21.1(d)).
61. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 48-7-21.1(e)).
62. Id. (codified as enacted at O.C.G.A. § 48-7-21.1(f)).
63. Id.
64. See Form 1-9 Compliance, The Law, http://www.formi9.com/form-i9-law.aspx (last
visited Sept. 9, 2006).
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) legally mandates that
U.S. employers verify the employment eligibility status of newly-hired employees.
IRCA made it unlawful for employers to knowingly hire or continue to employ
unauthorized workers. In response to the law, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), now an integrated component of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), created Form 1-9 and mandated its accurate and timely
completion by all U.S. employers and their employees.
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ly, encourages "document abuse," which occurs when an employer
requests more or different documents than are required to verify
employment eligibility and identity, rejects reasonably genuine-looking
documents, or specifies certain documents over others.6" All workauthorized individuals are protected from document abuse."
The
choice of documents belongs exclusively to the employee."
The passage of S.B. 529 has raised reasonable cause for concern
among immigrant workers and employers alike. The implementation of
the Act's provisions over the course of the next two years will force many
Georgia employers to become more proactive in their approach to
immigration compliance. Georgia's working immigrant population will
also be forced to become more educated on the new "authorized worker"
requirements, while illegal immigrants will likely find it increasingly
difficult to find work in Georgia.
III.
A.

EMPLOYMENT LAW PRINCIPLES - CASE LAW

Wrongful Termination
1. Employment-at-Will

The doctrine of employment-at-will has two readily identifiable
features: first, either the employee or employer may terminate the
employment relationship at any time, with or without cause; and second,
upon the termination of an employment-at-will contract, the employee
is barred from maintaining a wrongful termination claim." Explicitly
provided in O.C.G.A. section 34-7-169 is the doctrine of employment-atwill, indicating that unless the parties contract otherwise, employment
contracts in Georgia are presumed to be at-will.7" A large majority of

65. See generally Robison Fruit Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 147 F.3d 798, 801-02 (9th
Cir. 1998).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1), (6) (2000 & Supp. III 2006).
A person's or other entity's request ... for more or different documents than are
required ... or refusing to honor documents tendered that on their face
reasonably appear to be genuine shall be treated as an unfair immigration-related
employment practice if made for the purpose or with the intent of discriminating
against an individual ....
Id. § 1324b(a)(6).
67. See id. § 1324a(b) (2000).
68. See generally JAMES W. WIMBERLY, JR., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAW 20-21 (3d ed.
2000 & Supp. 2006).
69. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2004).
70. Id.
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the states now recognize a public policy exception to the doctrine of
While the employment-at-will doctrine has
employment-at-will.,
it has continued to be
significantly eroded in other jurisdictions,
72
practically inviolable in Georgia.
For example, in Reid v. City of Albany,7 3 the Georgia Court of
Appeals reviewed an employee's allegation of wrongful termination
stemming from the employee reporting his superior's improper use of
city resources.7 4 The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim.75 On appeal, the plaintiff contended that he was
terminated in retaliation for reporting his superior's wrongful use of city
resources and that such termination violated the City's personnel
policies and various state statutes.76 In response, the court of appeals
wrote:
Under Georgia law, at-will employees may be terminated for any or no
reason, and they generally cannot recover for wrongful discharge. The
motivation underlying the termination usually does not matter; an
employer may discharge an at-will employee without liability. As
noted by our Supreme Court, this bar to wrongful discharge claims in
the at-will employment context "is a fundamental
77 statutory rule
governing employer-employee relations in Georgia."
Moreover, the court of appeals held that "allegations that an at-will
employee's termination violated the employer's discipline polices do not
give rise to a wrongful discharge claim."78
The court of appeals specifically declined to create a judicial exception
to the statutory bar against former at-will employees maintaining
wrongful termination claims. 79 The court noted, "Although there can
be public policy exceptions to the [bar against wrongful discharge
claims], judicially created exceptions are not favored, and Georgia courts

71. Nancy Baumgarten, "Sometimes the Road Less Traveled is Less Traveled For a
Reason": The Need For Change in Georgia's Employment-At-Will Doctrine and Refusal to
Adopt the Public Policy Exception, 35 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1025-26 (2001).
72. Id. at 1025 ("Georgia and Alabama remain the only two states that still refuse to
recognize [a judicially-created public policy] exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.").
73. 276 Ga. App. 171, 622 S.E.2d 875 (2005).
74. Id. at 172, 622 S.E.2d at 877.
75. Id. at 171, 622 S.E.2d at 876.
76. Id. at 171-72, 622 S.E.2d at 877.
77. Id. (quoting Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279,280,528 S.E.2d 238,23940 (2000)) (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 172, 622 S.E.2d at 877.
79. Id.
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thus generally defer to the legislature to create them."8° Because the
court could not find a legislative public policy exception excluding
whistleblowers from employment-at-will in this case, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling.81
This case is significant because it demonstrates the reluctance of
Georgia courts to create public policy exceptions to the doctrine of
employment-at-will.82 Rather, the Georgia Court of Appeals will defer
to the legislature notwithstanding the fact that other jurisdictions create
such public policy exceptions.83 Thus, it appears that the doctrine of
employment-at-will is destined to remain impervious to wrongful
termination claims until the Georgia General Assembly creates an
applicable exception.
2. Duration Terms and Employment-at-Will
Employment contracts in Georgia are presumed to be at-will unless
the parties contract otherwise.8 4 This means that in the absence of a
specified length of employment, an employment-at-will relationship is
created. 8
Contract provisions specifying "permanent employment,
employment for life, or employment until retirement" are per se
For
indefinite, and are therefore employment-at-will contracts.8 8
example, in Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple,87 a teacher formerly
employed by a private school sued the school and its principal, alleging
breach of his employment contract. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the school, and the teacher appealed.88 On appeal,
the teacher argued that his contract had a one-year term because his
contract provided, "[A]lthough there are 187 working days, '[e]mployment is based upon a twelve month's pay system. Employees will be
paid the yearly salary agreed upon in twelve equal monthly payments
...,9 Specifically, the former employee relied on O.G.C.A. section

80. Id. at 172 n.9, 622 S.E.2d at 878 n.9 (quoting Reilly, 272 Ga. at 280, 528 S.E.2d at
239-40).
81. Id. at 172, 622 S.E.2d at 877.
82. Id. at 172 n.9, 622 S.E.2d at 878 n.9 (quoting Reilly, 272 Ga. at 280, 528 S.E.2d at
239-40).
83. Id.
84. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1.
85. See generally WIMBERLY, supra note 68, at 20-21.
86. Id. at 20 (quoting Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S.E.2d 442, 44344 (1978)).
87. 279 Ga. App. 71, 630 S.E.2d 604 (2006).
88. Id. at 71, 630 S.E.2d at 605.
89. Id. at 72, 630 S.E.2d at 605.
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34-7-1, which states, "'If a contract of employment provides that wages
are payable at a stipulated period, the presumption shall arise that the
hiring is for such period ....
The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the teacher's arguments,
pointing out that any presumption of duration was rebutted by language
in the contract that specifically provided "all employees are hired 'At
Will,"' and that "'[s]hould employment be terminated prior to the end of
the school year, the termination pay will be prorated on the number of
days worked .... "'9' Also, the court noted that the statement the
teacher relied upon referred only to a twelve-month "pay system," not a
contractual obligation to pay the teacher for a stipulated period of twelve
months. 92 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the contract was
unambiguous in creating an employment-at-will agreement, and thus,
the school
was authorized to terminate the teacher with or without
93
cause.

The Georgia Court of Appeals reached a similar decision in Jenkins v.
Georgia Department of Corrections.94 In that case, Jenkins, a former
Georgia Department of Corrections employee, sued the department for
breach of contract after terminating him despite an oral promise of
employment for "'as long as he wanted."' 95 The language that Jenkins
relied on was part of an earlier settlement agreement reached between
the litigants. The trial court granted the Department of Corrections's
motion to dismiss, and Jenkins appealed. 6 Although Jenkins's original
complaint did not allege fraud against the Department of Corrections,
Jenkins asserted on appeal that he was fraudulently induced to sign the
97
settlement agreement by the oral promise of permanent employment.
Turning first to the status of Jenkins's employment, the court of
appeals conceded that the settlement agreement could be interpreted as
an employment contract. 98 The court went on to hold, however, that
because the agreement did not contain any contractual language
specifying a time frame of employment, the employment was presumed
to be at-will.99 Accordingly, the employment relationship could be

90. Id. at 71, 630 S.E.2d at 605 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1) (omission in original).
91. Id. at 72, 630 S.E.2d at 605-06.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 71, 630 S.E.2d at 605.

94. 279 Ga. App. 160, 630 S.E.2d 654 (2006).
95. Id. at 160-61, 630 S.E.2d at 655.
96. Id. at 161, 630 S.E.2d at 655.
97. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 655-56.

98. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 655.
99. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 655-56.
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terminated by either party for any reason.'
Furthermore, the court
of appeals deemed Jenkins's fraud argument unpersuasive, stating: "It
is well settled that in the absence of a controlling contract, an oral
promise of 'permanent employment' or 'employment for life' is unenforceable and gives rise to no cause of action against an employer for
wrongful termination." 1
Moreover, the court noted in dicta that
"[fMraud cannot be predicated on a promise which is unenforceable at the
time it is made ....[Piromises of lifetime employment upon which the
promisee relies for establishing fraud were unenforceable even absent
any fraud at the time of their utterance." °2
These cases indicate Georgia courts' unwillingness to allow the
doctrine of employment-at-will to be eroded by ambiguous agreements.
An employment contract will continue to be presumed
at-will unless
10 3
specified time frames are written into such a contract.
3. Quantum Meruit
In Fay v.Custom One Homes, LLC, 0 4 the Georgia Court of Appeals
allowed recovery of the value of services rendered, notwithstanding an
employee being barred from maintaining a wrongful termination claim
by the doctrine of employment-at-will.' °
Fay was the president of
Custom One Homes, LLC ("Custom One"). After being evicted from its
offices, Custom One began building its own office building, and it put
Fay in charge of the project as the general contractor. Evidence
indicated that the CEO of Custom One orally contracted with Fay by

100. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 656.
101. Id.; see also Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 228-29, 599 S.E.2d 158, 161
(2004) (citing Ford Clinic v. Potter, 246 Ga. App. 320, 322, 540 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2000)
(holding that an oral promise stating that an employment contract will be valid for an
indefinite period of time is not enforceable); Moore v. BellSouth Mobility, 243 Ga. App. 674,
676, 534 S.E.2d 133, 135 (2000) (holding that oral promises that future events will occur
are not enforceable by at-will employees and cannot provide grounds for a breach of
contract claim); Alston v. Brown Transp. Corp., 182 Ga. App. 632, 633, 356 S.E.2d 517, 519
(1987) (holding an oral promise of promotion unenforceable where the employment contract
is terminable at will)).
102. Jenkins, 279 Ga. App. at 162, 630 S.E.2d at 656; see also WIMBERLY, supra note
68, at 21 ("[E]ven if an employer's policy is considered as a contract, it is terminable at will
unless it specifies a period of employment").
103. See Busbin, 242 Ga. at 613, 250 S.E.2d at 443-44; Moran v. NAV Servs., 189 Ga.
App. 825, 826, 377 S.E.2d 909, 910 (1989); Porter v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 189 Ga. App.
818, 818-19, 377 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1988); Bramblett v. Bass, 189 Ga. App. 10, 10-11, 375
S.E.2d 106, 108 (1988).
104. 276 Ga. App. 188, 622 S.E.2d 870 (2005).
105. Id. at 192-93, 622 S.E.2d at 874.
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agreeing to give him a twenty or thirty percent stake in the office
building or the holding company that owned the office building as
compensation for a job well done. Subsequently, Fay was terminated,
and the parties could not come to an agreement on the value of his stake
in the office building or holding company. When negotiations failed, Fay
filed suit in quantum meruit for the value of services rendered in excess
of his job as president of Custom One." 6 The trial court found that
Fay's "status as 'an at-will salaried employee' precluded [his] recovery
in quantum meruit."l ' Consequently, it granted summary judgment
in favor of Custom One, and Fay appealed.'0 8
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment on Fay's quantum meruit claim.0 9
The court of appeals noted, "In Georgia, the reasonable value of extra
work performed outside the scope of one's job duties can be recovered in
quantum meruit."" °
B.

Torts Associated With Employment
1. Negligent Hiring and Retention

The theories of negligent hiring and negligent retention are closely
related and are established by virtually the same elements. The
distinction between the theories of negligent hiring and negligent
retention is that an employer negligently hires a dangerous employee in
the former, whereas the employer negligently retains a dangerous
employee in the latter."' Employees and third parties may make
claims for negligent hiring, negligent retention, or both.'12 Georgia
case law and the Georgia Code establish that a claim of negligent hiring
or retention requires that (1) the employer knew, or should have known
in the course of ordinary care, that the employee was incompetent, and
(2) such incompetence was the direct and proximate cause of damage to
the complaining party under color of the employee's employment or
during the employee's work hours."'

106. Id. at 190, 622 S.E.2d at 872.
107. Id. at 192, 622 S.E.2d at 874.
108. Id. at 190, 622 S.E.2d at 872.
109. Id. at 192, 622 S.E.2d at 874.
110. Id. at 193, 622 S.E.2d at 874.
111. WIMBERLY, supra note 68, at 391.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 391-93. But see TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc., v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456,
462, 590 S.E.2d 807, 815 (2003) (holding that negligent hiring or retention may be
applicable to torts committed by employees outside the scope of their employment where
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In Poole v. North Georgia Conference of the Methodist Church,
Inc.,"4 a pastor was accused of maintaining a clandestine sexual
relationship with a parishioner's wife while simultaneously counseling
the parishioner on his marital problems. The parishioner brought an
action against the church and pastor seeking damages for negligent
hiring and retention arising out of the alleged breach of confidential
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
relationship.
summary judgment and the parishioner appealed.1 15 On appeal, the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, holding that the
parishioner did not establish a negligent hiring or retention claim
because he failed to show that the church knew or should have known,
in the ordinary course of care, that the pastor was not suited for the
particular employment prior to the alleged tort.1 6 Evidence showed
that the pastor was interviewed by the District Committee of Ordained
Ministry and then by the Conference Board of Ordained Ministry, and
finally, psychologically evaluated by a psychologist with the Emory
School of Medicine prior to being hired. None of the evaluative bodies
indicated that the pastor was unfit for service." 7 Relying on a fundamental element of negligent hiring and retention, the court of appeals
wrote, "[A]n employer may be held liable only where there is sufficient
evidence to establish that the employer reasonably knew or should have
behavior
known of an employee's 'tendencies' to engage in certain
1 s
relevant to the injuries allegedly incurred by the plaintiff."
2. Respondeat Superior, Authorization, and Ratification
The term "respondeat superior" refers to a legal doctrine by which
vicarious liability may be imposed on an employer for the torts of an
employee without finding fault on the part of the employer." 9 The
conditions under which respondeat superior liability may be imposed on
an employer vary widely:

there is a relationship between the employer and the tort victim).
114. 273 Ga. App. 536, 615 S.E.2d 604 (2005).
115. Id. at 536, 615 S.E.2d at 605-06.
116. Id. at 540, 615 S.E.2d at 608.
117. Id. at 538, 615 S.E.2d at 607.
118. Id. at 537-38 n.3, 615 S.E.2d at 607 n.3 (quoting Munroe v. Universal Health
Servs., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (2004)).
119. Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action Against Employer to Recover Under Doctrine of
Respondeat Superiorfor IntentionalTorts Committed by Employee, in 17 CAUSES OF ACTION
647, § 2 (Oct. 2005).
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[Lliability can be imposed under one or more of three theories: (1) that
the tortious conduct was within the tortfeasor's scope of employment;
(2) that the tortious conduct was within the tortfeasor's scope of
apparent authority; and/or (3) that the employer authorized or ratified
the tortious conduct. Recovery under the first theory is entirely
dependent upon the employer-employee (master-servant) relationship.
The other theories may be viable where the tortfeasor is an agent but
not an employee of the defendant. 2 '
In Travis Pruitt & Associates, PC. v. Hooper,12 ' Hooper, a former
employee of Travis Pruitt, brought an action against the company.
Hooper alleged sexual harassment perpetrated upon her by Taylor, a
former co-worker, while at work.
She sought damages under the
principles of respondeat superior or ratification.12 2 After the employer's motion for summary judgment was denied by the trial court, the
Georgia Court of Appeals granted the employer's application for
interlocutory appeal. 2 ' On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's
ruling and held that Hooper could not make out a prima facie case under
either respondeat superior or ratification.2
In so holding, the court of appeals pointed out, "Under the principle
of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for negligent or intentional
torts committed by an employee in furtherance of and within the scope
of the employer's business. " "' The court further noted that Taylor's
alleged harassment was directed at Hooper "for purely personal reasons
entirely disconnected from [the company] business."126 Consequently,
Travis Pruitt could not be held liable under respondeat superior for
Taylor's actions because Taylor's actions were not committed in the scope
of the employer's business.'2 7
Turning to Hooper's ratification claim, the court began by overruling
the holdings of four previous Georgia Court of Appeals cases, Wiley v.
Georgia Power Co., 128 Newsome v. Cooper-Wiss, Inc.,' 2 1 Trimble v.
Circuit City Stores, 3 ° and Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.'

120. Id. (citations omitted).
121. 277 Ga. App. 1, 625 S.E.2d 445 (2005).
122. Id. at 1, 625 S.E.2d at 447.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 3-5, 625 S.E.2d at 448-49.
125. Id. at 3, 625 S.E.2d at 448.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 134 Ga. App. 187, 192-93, 213 S.E.2d 550, 554-55 (1975), overruled on other
grounds by Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442.
129. 179 Ga. App. 670, 673, 347 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1986).
130. 220 Ga. App. 498, 501, 469 S.E.2d 776, 779 (1996).
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The court of appeals overruled those cases to the extent they held that
an employer could be liable via ratification for sexual harassment
committed by an employee not in furtherance of the employer's business,
but for purely personal reasons entirely disconnected from the employer's
business. 132 The court held that for liability via ratification to be
imposed on an employer "there must be evidence that the employee's
conduct was done in furtherance of the employer's business and within
the scope of the employment." 13 3 In this regard, the court stated that
"contrary to the holdings in Wiley, Newsome, Trimble, and Mears, the
long-established rule is that, where an employee 'was acting solely for
himself... there is no such thing as a master assuming, by ratification,
liability for an act of another in which the master had no part.'""'
The court further stated that not only had a clear rule been defined by
the Georgia Court of Appeals and Georgia Supreme Court cases
regarding ratification, but that there is a statutory basis for the rule as
well. 35 In reversing the trial court's ruling on Hooper's ratification
claim, the court of appeals provided ample clarification for Georgia
practitioners: in Georgia, ratification cannot lie where an employee has
committed a tortious act exclusively for himself and not at all for the
employer.136
C.

Restrictive Covenants
1. General Parameters

Agreements that place general restraints on trade with the effect of
lessening competition and encouraging monopolies are void as against
public policy. 3 7 Generally, non-competition agreements are disfavored
in contractual relations because they place restrictions on trade, thereby
thwarting competition.' 3
Nonetheless, courts will uphold a noncompete agreement when such an agreement merely places a partial
restraint upon trade. 139 A non-competition agreement is valid as a

131. 225 Ga. App. 636, 641, 484 S.E.2d 659, 665 (1997).
132. Travis Pruitt& Assocs., 277 Ga. App. at 3, 625 S.E.2d at 449.
133. Id. at 3-4, 625 S.E.2d at 449 (citing Stinespring v. Fields, 129 Ga. App. 715, 71518, 229 S.E.2d 495, 496-98 (1976)).
134. Id. at 4, 625 S.E.2d at 449 (quoting Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett Co. v. Spivey, 53
Ga. App. 117, 119-20, 185 S.E. 147, 148 (1936)) (citation omitted).
135. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-12 (2000).
136. Travis Pruitt& Assocs., 277 Ga. App. at 3-4, 625 S.E.2d at 449.
137. See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 (Supp. 2006).
138. WIMBERLY, supra note 68, at 75.
139. Id.
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partial restraint on trade if the agreement is written and specifies (1)
time, (2) territorial limitations, and (3) activity restrictions.14 ° Additionally, the agreement must be reasonable."' Whether it is reasonable is a question of law for the court to decide, and the court will apply
varying levels of scrutiny to determine whether the contract is reasonable, depending upon the type of contract. 4 2 When the agreement is
ancillary to an employment agreement, a strict standard applies,
meaning the entire agreement is invalid if any provision therein is
considered overbroad or unreasonable. "4 But when the agreement is
made pursuant to a contract for the sale of a business, a less stringent
standard applies, meaning the agreement will survive despite the
presence of broad provisions.'" In applying this less stringent standard, the court may "blue pencil," i.e., rewrite or sever, provisions
deemed overly broad or unreasonable.' 4 5
2. Legal Duty
In Mau, Inc. v. Human Technologies, Inc., 1" several former employees left MAU, Inc. ("MAU") and started Human Technologies, Inc.
("HTI") in a targeted growth area of MAU. The former employees were
aware of MAU's attempts to enter the market in the area where they set
up HTI, but MAU had not bound the former employees to enforceable
restrictive covenants in the area. MAU sued HTI, alleging, inter alia,
that one of the former employees, previously the vice president of MAU,
breached his fiduciary duty to the company. The trial court granted HTI
summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, and MAU
appealed the judgment.
Conversely, HTI appealed the denial of
summary judgment on a tortious interference claim leveled against it by
MAU, which had alleged that the former employees had a duty not to
interfere with the business contracts and relationships it had established.'47 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that absent
valid non-competition and non-solicitation covenants, the former
employees could not have breached any legal duty owed to MAU because
such duties did not exist. 48 In dicta, the court stated that even if a

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 75-76.
145. Id.
146. 274 Ga. App. 891, 619 S.E.2d 394 (2005).
147. Id. at 891-93, 619 S.E.2d at 395-96.
148. Id. at 896, 619 S.E.2d at 398.
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duty had been demonstrated, MAU failed to identify any of its customers
who were improperly contacted by HTI. 49
Similarly, in Continental Maritime Services, Inc. v. Maritime Bureau,
Inc., 5 ° Continental Maritime Services, Inc. ("Continental") sued
Maritime Bureau, Inc. ("MBI") for tortious interference with business
relations after the discharge of a Continental employee who was a
principal in MBI. The former employee had solicited business for
Continental as part of his employment duties. After the former
employee was discharged from Continental, he contacted several
potential clients he solicited while in the employ of Continental to
apprise them that he was no longer with Continental and that he would
be able to serve their needs through MBI. At the trial level, the superior
court judge51granted MBI's motion for a directed verdict, and Continental
1
appealed.
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that MBI was not liable
for tortious interference because there was no "employment contract or
noncompete agreement" prohibiting the former employee from contacting
Continental's customers.'5 2
In addition, the court held that the
tortious interference claim could not stand because Continental
presented no evidence to show that it would have developed business
from any of the customers that the former employee contacted.' 53
3. Reasonableness
i. Overbreadth. In Whimsical Expressions, Inc. v.Brown,... Brown,
a former painter for Whimsical Expressions, Inc. ("Whimsical"),
continued to paint at the request of past clients from Whimsical.155
Whimsical brought a breach of contract action against Brown for
violation of non-compete and non-solicitation covenants. 5 6
The
restrictive covenants stated:
Employee agrees not to work as a painter or sales person in the
decorative or faux painting business within Fulton, Gwinnett, Cobb
and Forsyth Counties, Georgia for a period of two (2) years following
termination of Employee's engagement with the Company ...

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
275 Ga. App. 533, 621 S.E.2d 775 (2005).
Id. at 533-34, 621 S.E.2d at 776-77.
Id. at 536, 621 S.E.2d at 778-79.
Id.
275 Ga. App. 420, 620 S.E.2d 635 (2005).
Id. at 423, 620 S.E.2d at 638.
Id. at 420, 620 S.E.2d at 636.
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Employee agrees not to solicit or attempt to solicit any decorative or
faux painting business from any clients of the Company whose
residence or principal place of business is located within Fulton,
Gwinnett, Cobb and Forsyth Counties, Georgia with whom Employee
had material contact during his or her employment with the Company,
for a period of two years (2) following termination of Employee's
engagement with the Company. Material contact exists between
Employee and a client if the Employee dealt with the client or
furnished painting service to the client while working as an employee
of the Company within one (1) year prior to the date of Employee's
termination of employment with the Company.'57
Beyond handing out the former employer's cards, the former employee
never worked as a salesperson for the former employer. At the trial
level, the superior court granted the former employee's motion for
summary judgment, and the former employer appealed. 58
On appeal, the issue before the Georgia Court of Appeals was whether
the non-compete and non-solicitation clauses of the former employee's
contract were valid." 9 The former employer maintained that the trial
court erred in finding the covenants unenforceable.16 ° The Georgia
Court of Appeals, however, did not agree and affirmed the lower court's
ruling, concluding that "because [the former employer] attempted to
preclude [the former employee] not only from performing painting
services for prior clients, but also from acting as a salesperson in the...
painting business, [the covenant] was overly broad." 16' The court
further emphasized that the overbreadth of the covenant was its fatal
flaw, noting, "Whimsical did not employ 'sales persons' and there was no
evidence ... that [the former employee] ever acted as one . . ..
Turning to the non-solicitation clause, the court stated that the nonsolicitation covenant was not breached--despite the former employee
continuing to work with prior clients of the former employer-because
the prior clients sought out and requested services from the former
employee.6 3 The court maintained the differentiation between affirmative solicitation and performance of services for a previous custom-

157. Id. at 421-22, 620 S.E.2d at 637.
158. Id. at 420, 423, 620 S.E.2d at 636, 638.
159. Id. at 421, 620 S.E.2d at 636.
160. Id. at 422, 620 S.E.2d at 637.
161. Id. at 423, 620 S.E.2d at 637-38 (noting that the covenants' overbreadth requires
the affirmation of lower court's ruling because Georgia does not follow the doctrine of
severability in the context of employment contracts).
162. Id., 620 S.E.2d at 638.
163. Id.
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er.'" Thus, a former employee bound by a non-solicitation covenant
can continue to work with customers of his previous employer so long as
he or she does not affirmatively seek their business. This case indicates
Georgia courts' predisposition to disallow any covenant that is not
narrowly tailored to the justified protection needs of employers.1" 5
ii. Time and Territorial Restrictions. In Palmer & Cay of Georgia,
16
the Georgia Supreme Court was called
Inc. v. Lockton Companies,
upon to determine whether a non-solicitation covenant was unenforceable because of a failure to include a restriction on the period of time
during which employees had served customers and its lack of territorial
limitation. 167 Leading up to the suit, several employees left Palmer &
Cay of Georgia, Inc. ("P&C") and accepted positions with Lockton
Companies, Inc. ("Lockton"). Prior to leaving P&C, the former employees
signed a restrictive covenant agreement which fundamentally provided
that for a two-year period after leaving their employment, the former
employees would not in any way solicit or attempt to solicit or take away
the insurance business of any of the customers of their former employer
who were served by the former employees during their terms of
employment with P&C. There was no time limit on when the former
employees may have served P&C's customers. Lockton filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the enforceability of the non-solicitation
covenant. In the declaratory judgment action, Lockton asserted that the
non-solicitation covenant was unenforceable for failure to include a
restriction on the period of time during which the former employees had
served customers of P&C. Alternatively, Lockton argued that the nonsolicitation covenant was unenforceable for lack of territorial limitation.
enforceable. 168 On
The trial court found that the covenant was 1not
69
affirmed.
Appeals
of
appeal, the Georgia Court
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the non-solicitation
covenant was not rendered unenforceable by the failure to include a
restriction on the period of time during which employees had served
customers. 7 ° The court also held that the lack of territorial limitation
did not render the covenant unenforceable.' 7 ' At first glance, the

164.
165.
(1977).
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
See Howard Schultz & Assocs. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 183, 236 S.E.2d 265, 267
280 Ga. 479, 629 S.E.2d 800 (2006).
Id. at 480, 629 S.E.2d at 802.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 484, 629 S.E.2d at 804.
Id. at 483, 629 S.E.2d at 803.
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supreme court's holdings seem to be a break from long-held restrictive
covenant precedent.'7 2 However, the court explained that its holding
was consistent with longstanding precedent in that the obligations of the
non-solicitation covenant were not vitiated by failure to include
restrictions on the period of time during which the employees had served
P&C's customers. 7 3 The critical factors were whether the former
employees had ever served the customers and whether the customers
were still doing business with P&C. 74 The court also emphasized:
[T]he employer has a protectible interest in the customer relationships
its former employee[s] established and/or nurtured while employed by
the employer, and is entitled to protect itself from the risk that a
former employee might appropriate customers by taking unfair
advantage
of the contacts developed while working for the employ175
er.

This interest is "not diminished by the length of time since the [former]
employee may have ceased to serve the customer, but depends instead
on the fact that the customer relationship was either established or
nurtured by the employee." Explaining its holding as to the territorial
restriction, and again quoting W.R. Grace & Co., the court noted in
pertinent part:
"Where the parameters of the restrictive covenant are as narrow as
those set forth in the certified question, i.e., where the former employee
is prohibited from post-employment solicitation of employer customers
which the employee contacted during his tenure with the employer,
there is no need for a territorial restriction expressed in geographic
terms."[ 76] Thus, W.R. Grace & Co. is not a departure from any of
our prior cases which recognize that, when dealing with a covenant
that prohibits the solicitation of customers whom the employee served,
the entire length of service of the employee establishes the permissible
temporal boundary. Had the intent been to hold that a lesser time
limit on the former employee's contact with the customer was required,
this Court would have overruled, not reaffirmed, prior cases which

172. See, e.g., Howard Schultz, 239 Ga. at 183,236 S.E.2d at 267; Rakestraw v. Lanier,
104 Ga. 188, 201, 30 S.E. 735, 741 (1898).
173. Palmer & Cay, 280 Ga. at 482, 629 S.E.2d at 803-04.
174. Id. at 480-81, 629 S.E.2d at 802; see W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn Div. v. Mouyal,
262 Ga. 464, 466-68, 422 S.E.2d 529, 532-33 (1992); Wiley v. Royal Cup, 258 Ga. 357, 35859, 370 S.E.2d 744, 745-46 (1988); Marcoin v. Waldron, 244 Ga. 169, 171-72, 259 S.E.2d
433, 434-35 (1979).
175. Palmer& Cay, 280 Ga. at 480, 629 S.E.2d at 802 (citation omitted) (quoting W.R.
Grace, 262 Ga. at 466, 422 S.E.2d at 532).
176. Id. at 482, 629 S.E.2d at 803 (quoting W.R. Grace, 262 Ga. at 467-68, 422 S.E.2d
at 533).
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recognize the employer's unqualified interest in protecting its customers who were served by the former employee.' 77
4. The Arbitration Exception
As noted earlier, Georgia's well-established jurisprudence requires that
a restrictive covenant meet a certain bright line test before it may be
upheld.17
However, in Malice v. Coloplast Corp., 7 9 the Georgia
Court of Appeals rejected a bright line test when reviewing the superior
court's decision to confirm an arbitrator's award enforcing restrictive
covenants ancillary to an employment contract.8 0 The case arose from
a dispute between a former high-level executive and his former employer
about the terms of the former employee's separation package. Before
resigning from his position with the former employer, the executive
signed an employment agreement that contained several restrictive
covenants. 81
Those covenants included non-compete and nonsolicitation covenants that were extremely broad territorially (essentially
a national prohibition on trade) and forbade competition not only in
products similar to those that the former employer sold and distributed,
but also any products that it "contemplated selling or distributing" while
the former employee was in its employ.'82 The agreement also included an arbitration clause, which provided that all disputes would be
submitted to arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association's Commercial Division. The employment agreement was
later amended to include new duties and severance pay even if the
former employee chose to leave and was not terminated. In addition, the
agreement included advanced severance pay should the former employer
exercise its right to invoke the covenant not to compete provision in the
employment contract. Soon after the amendment to the contract became
effective, the former employee resigned. Upon notice of the employee's
resignation, the employer attempted to tender severance to the employee
on two occasions, but the checks were immediately returned. Subsequently, the former employee became a partner in a new business that

177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. See Howard Schultz, 239 Ga. at 183, 236 S.E.2d at 267.
179. 278 Ga. App. 395, 629 S.E.2d 95 (2006).
180. Id. at 395, 397, 629 S.E.2d at 96, 98 (holding that "[i]t
is well established under
both federal and Georgia law that 'judicial review of an arbitration award is among the
narrowest known to the law" Id. at 397, 629 S.E.2d at 98 (quoting Gupta v. Cisco Systems,
274 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation and punctuation omitted))).
181. Id. at 395-96, 629 S.E.2d at 96-97.
182. Id. at 396, 629 S.E.2d at 97.
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competed in the industry of his former employer. The former employer
brought suit against the former employee and the dispute was removed
to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the restrictive covenants were
enforceable and the superior court affirmed.1 3 On appeal to the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the former employee alleged that the arbitral
award operated as a sanction in violation
of public policy and the law of
4
restrictive covenants in Georgia.18
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the restrictive covenants were
enforceable.1 5 The employment agreement specified that any dispute
would be governed by the American Arbitration Association's Commercial Arbitration Rules, which was considered and followed by the
arbitrator in his decision. 186 Accordingly, the court of appeals held
that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 8 7 was the prevailing law on
confirmation of an arbitral award, not Georgia law. 88 Consequently,
the court of appeals could only invalidate the confirmation of the
89
arbitrator's award if it manifestly disregarded applicable state law.1
The court noted that manifest disregard for the law can only be shown
if the arbitrator: (1) appreciated the existence of a clearly governing
legal principle and (2) decided to ignore or pay no attention to it. 9°
The court of appeals held that the arbitrator did at least consider the
clear legal principles (even if he did not enforce those principles).' 9'
Therefore, manifest disregard for applicable state law could not be established.' 92
Consequently, despite precedent striking overly broad
restrictive covenants as a matter of course, 193 the court concluded that

183. Id. at 395-97, 629 S.E.2d at 96-97.
184. Id. at 397, 629 S.E.2d at 97-98.
185. Id. at 395, 629 S.E.2d at 96.
186. Id. at 397, 400, 629 S.E.2d at 98.
187. U.S.C. tit. 9 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
188. Malice, 278 Ga. App. at 395, 397, 629 S.E.2d at 96, 98 (holding that "'the FAA
rather than Georgia law controls confirmation of an arbitration award made pursuant to
the FAA'" (quoting Adage, Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A., 267 Ga. App. 877, 878, 600 S.E.2d
829, 830 (2004))); see also Howard Schultz, 239 Ga. at 183, 236 S.E.2d at 267 (describing
a very strict standard of review when construing the validity of a restrictive covenant in
an employment contract context under Georgia law).
189. Malice, 278 Ga. App. at 398, 629 S.E.2d at 98; see B.L. Harbert Intl, LLC v.
Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir. 2006); see also O.G.C.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5)
(2006) (codifying the term "manifest disregard of the law" as a basis for vacating an
arbitration award).
190. Malice, 278 Ga. App. at 398, 629 S.E.2d at 98-99.
191. Id. at 400, 629 S.E.2d at 99.
192. Id.
193. See Am. Software USA v. Moore, 264 Ga. 480, 483, 448 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1994)
(holding that where territory covered is "anywhere in the United States of America," a
prohibition on contacting customers with whom the employee did not have a relationship
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the arbitrator did not commit manifest disregard because he considered
Georgia law, even if such consideration yielded a decision in conflict with
precedent. 94
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although labor and employment issues arising under Georgia law
often are not as complex as their federal counterparts, the issues that
arise under state law become more challenging with each passing year.
Adding to this challenge is the increasing overlap of state and federal
issues. Regardless of whether a practitioner professes to specialize in
state, federal, administrative, trial, or other matters pertaining to labor
and employment law, it is important to recognize that the laws and legal
proceedings in one area of law can and do impact relations between
employer and employee in others.

is too broad to be reasonable); W.R. Grace, 262 Ga. at 467 n.2, 422 S.E.2d at 532 n.2
(holding that a "prohibition against doing business with any of an employer's customers,
whether or not a relationship existed between the customer and the former employee, is
overbroad" in the absence of a reasonable territorial restriction (emphasis added)); Howard
Schultz, 239 Ga. at 183, 236 S.E.2d at 267; Sanford v. RDA Consultants, Ltd., 244 Ga. App.
308, 310, 535 S.E.2d 321, 324 (2000) (quoting W.R. Grace, 262 Ga. at 467 n.2, 422 S.E.2d
at 532 n.2); AGA, LLC v. Rubin, 243 Ga. App. 772, 773, 533 S.E.2d 804,805 (2000) (holding
that a territorial limitation not determinable until the time of the employee's termination
invalidates the provision and the entire agreement).
194. Malice, 278 Ga. App. at 399, 629 S.E.2d at 99 (holding "[a]n error in interpreting
the applicable law does not constitute 'manifest disregard.' The applicable law must have
been deliberately ignored").

